ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kurkuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

727 In order to understand the development of nationalism during the remaining twenty months of German occupation of the East Ukraine, it is necessary to give some attention to the effects of German policy on aspects of life not directly connected with nationalist feeling. A number of volumes of extremely unpleasant reading could be devoted to the misery which the blind actions of the German rulers inflicted on the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet Union. Here only an extremely brief description of four ill-conceived policies which did most to disrupt the lives of the people of the area, and in particular to affect indirectly the character of the nationalist movements, can be attempted.

727 697 The first, and in many respects the most horrible failure of German policy, resulted in the death of innumerable Soviet prisoners of war. In the summer and fall of 1941, hundreds of thousands of Red army soldiers fell into German hands. Most captures took place because of the swift German advance and the great ascendancy of German arms; but at least in part they resulted from a lack of will to fight for the Communist system and the hope that German imprisonment would soon be followed by a freer life for the Soviet peoples. The German army was quite unprepared for the extent of the surrenders. However, no amount of difficulty in caring for the prisoners can excuse the horrible consequences of their neglect which, unlike most other atrocities committed in the east, was primarily the fault of the Wehrmacht. Inefficiency or brutality of subordinate *Etappentruppen* [rear area troops] was partly to blame, but the basic ruthlessness of many higher officers also played a major role, for it placed a premium on calloused inhumanity on the part of subordinates.[56] Countless thousands of prisoners were shut in barbed-wire enclosures in the open plains. Food was so insufficient that the captives were rapidly reduced to living skeletons; by fall cannibalism had made its appearance.[57] "Gaunt yellow faces protruding from the collars of greatcoats—unabashed human misery," as a Ukrainian visitor to

[56] Cf. the views of high Wehrmacht commanders cited in Chapter VI in connection with suppression of partisans.

[57] Report of Armament Inspector for the Ukraine to Armament Division Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Zur Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine, November 29, 1941, PS 2174 (hereafter referred to as PS 2174).

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one of the camps put it.[58] As colder weather approached, typhus combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands of deaths.

Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans.[59] Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.[60] Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread.

A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was the predominant form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union.

The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissors crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose fundamentally because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products. The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their

[58] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2.

[59] Interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, June 16, 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); *Nastup*, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338).

[60] Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points out that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—i.e., while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority.